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REGULATING PHYSICIAN INVESTMENT AND
REFERRAL BEHAVIOR IN THE COMPETITIVE
HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE OF THE
'90s-AN ARGUMENT FOR
DECENTRALIZATION
Abstrac" Congress regulates the investment and referral practices of physicians through
the federal Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute. The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute, however,
limits the ability of physicians to adapt their investment and referral practices to an
increasingly competitive health care industry. In order to restrict fraudulent practices
without restricting competition, the authority to regulate physician investment and refer-
ral practices should be returned to the states, who can recognize and exempt beneficial
competitive practices from the reach of the applicable state statutes.
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic evolution in the delivery
and payment of health care services in the United States. Competition
has restructured the health care industry.' Individual practitioners
face increased competition from new corporate forms of health care
providers, whose structure enables them to better respond to market
and regulatory changes.
Federal Medicare2 and Medicaid3 laws, however, have been slow to
respond to the new era of competitive health care. Specifically, the
law governing physician investment and referral practices-the Medi-
care-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendment 4 -fails to conform
to changes in the delivery of health care. The Anti-Fraud and Abuse
statute regulates a wide variety of physician activity.5 This Comment
focuses on the application of the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute to the
investment and referral practices of physicians, as current restrictions
on these practices pose a formidable barrier to delivering cost-effective
health care.
Congress enacted the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute to address the
improper use of federal health care funds. The statute, however, actu-
ally promotes the inefficient use of federal funds by discouraging cost-
efficient investment and referral arrangements between health care
providers. Because the necessary balance between regulation and
1. See generally P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
2. See infra note 16 and accompanying text (describing the Medicare program).
3. See infra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the state Medicaid programs).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute].
5. In addition to prohibiting certain physician investment and referral behavior, the Anti-
Fraud and Abuse statute prohibits other fraudulent practices, such as false representation in
applications for Medicare-Medicaid reimbursement. See generally MEDICARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW (J. Johnson & J. Seifert eds. 1986) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW].
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competition in the health care industry differs among the states, the
states should regulate the investment and referral practices of
physicians.
I. PHYSICIANS WHO REFER PATIENTS FOR FINANCIAL
GAIN
A. The Conflict of Interest
A physician who refers patients to health care providers in which
the physician holds an investment risks a potential conflict of interest.6
The physician's duty to the patient, traditionally considered primary
to all other duties,7 may be compromised by the possibility of financial
gain from the referral. The referring physician may elevate monetary
self-interest over the patient's medical interest in referring patients to a
facility in which the physician has invested.
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) measured the prev-
alence of financial arrangements between physicians and referral facili-
ties8 in 1989.' The OIG estimated that 11.8 percent of physicians refer
Medicare patients to a facility in which the physicians carry an owner-
ship interest.'" The OIG survey also targeted physicians who invest in
independent clinical laboratories and discovered that these investing
physicians authorize 45 percent more laboratory referrals than non-
6. Conflicts between a physician's financial investments and the physician's allegiance to a
patient must be resolved to the patient's benefit. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT
OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMA § 8.03 (1986).
Referrals by physicians without an investment or other financial interest in a referral facility
may also trigger a conflict of interest. For example, physicians who refer patients to other health
care providers in exchange for a referral or finder's fee, create a conflict between the physician's
financial interest and the patient's medical interest. This Comment, however, does not address
referrals by physicians who do not have an investment interest in referral facilities.
7. "The health of my patient will be my first consideration." 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS
1749 (W. Reich ed. 1978) (excerpt from the Geneva Declaration, considered the modern version
of the Hippocratic Oath).
8. Referral facilities provide a broad range of health care services not generally offered by
physicians. For example, physicians refer patients to laboratories, pharmacies, and durable
medical equipment suppliers. In addition, physicians refer patients to specialized health care
providers, such as radiologists.
9. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES, REPORT TO
CONGRESS (Doc. No. OAI-12-88-01410) (May 1989) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
10. Id. at app. B, table Bl. According to the OIG report, "referring physicians invest in a
wide range of businesses, including.., laboratories; durable medical equipment suppliers; home
health agencies; hospitals; nursing homes; ambulatory surgical centers; and health maintenance
organizations." Id. at iii.
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investing physicians." The OIG estimated that this increased use of
laboratory services cost the Medicare program an additional $28.1
million in 1987.12 Although the accuracy of these statistics may be
challenged,' 3 they demonstrate a need to ensure that patient needs-
rather than profit motives-direct the referral decisions of
physicians.' 4
B. The Federal Government's Interest in Regulating Physician
Investment and Referral Behavior
Congress regulates the investment and referral practices of physi-
cians who treat persons enrolled in the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams because such practices may add to the cost of medical
treatment.' 5 The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute protects the Medicare
and Medicaid programs from unnecessary costs charged by physicians
who order additional referrals to maximize the return on their
investment.
L The Medicare-Medicaid Reimbursement System
Medicare provides federal monies for medical services received by
eligible elderly, disabled, and persons with end-stage renal failure.' 6
Physicians receive payment for treating Medicare beneficiaries by sub-
mitting an application for Medicare reimbursement to a federally-
11. Id.
12. The, increased use estimate is subject to a 90 percent confidence interval, with a lower
limit of $13.7 million and an upper limit of $42.4 million. Id. at app. B. In 1987, $28.1 million
represented .03 percent of federal Medicare expenditures, which approximated $79.6 billion in
that year. CALIFORNIA ASW'N OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYS.; 1989 HOSPITAL FACT BOOK
18, table 1.12 (1989).
13. The American Medical Association (AMA) challenged the OIG estimate; the AMA's
own survey revealed a lower percentage, 7.1 percent, of physicians referring patients to a facility
in which they have an investment interest. Statement of AMA to the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env'4 Comm. on Energy and Commerce app. 1 (June 8, 1989) (statement of J. Todd, MD)
(copy on file with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter AMA Statement].
14. The OIG report did not inquire whether the additional referrals represented medically
necessary procedures or whether financial concerns motivated the additional referrals. A case-
by-ease investigation of the reasons for the additional referrals would have revealed whether
medical necessity or financial gain motivated the additional referrals, and would have further
isolated the magnitude of the conflict of interest problem posed by physician investment in
referral facilities.
15. A physician who sends Medicare or Medicaid patients to a referral facility in which the
physician has an investment interest has a financial incentive to abuse the referral privilege and
authorize unnecessary referrals, which may increase the cost of health care.
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West Supp. 1989). Medicare Part A provides reimbursement for
services performed by hospitals and other institutional providers. Id. Medicare Part B provides
reimbursement for services performed by physicians and other health care professionals in a non-
institutional setting. Id. § 1395j.
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approved insurance carrier.1 7 In contrast, physicians receive payment
for treating Medicaid beneficiaries by submitting reimbursement appli-
cations directly to a state agency. 8 Medicaid is a cooperative federal-
state program that provides payments for medical services for the
poor, the disabled, the elderly, and other qualified recipients.' 9 The
federal government partially subsidizes Medicaid programs by issuing
matching grants to the states.2" The states control expenditures of fed-
eral Medicaid grants and retain the authority to formulate eligibility
requirements for Medicaid recipients.2 '
Medicare and Medicaid programs currently reimburse physicians
according to a retrospective system of payment; physicians calculate
the reimbursement rate after delivering the necessary medical services
to Medicare or Medicaid patients. The actual cost of the services
received determines the amount of reimbursement.22
2. The Federal Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute
The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute23 regulates
the investment and referral practices of physicians. Congress enacted
17. Assignment, 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 3350 (Aug. 1989). The insurance
carrier pays the physician 80 percent of the reasonable charge over and above the deductible.
The physician collects the remaining 20 percent and any applicable deductible directly from the
Medicare patient. Id.
18. Although state Medicaid programs vary, most states reimburse Medicaid providers
through a state agency. The Arizona program illustrates a different approach. Arizona allocates
its Medicaid dollars through health maintenance organizations. See Babbitt & Rose, Building a
Better Mousetrap: Health Care Reform and the Arizona Program, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 243, 263
(1986).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 1983 and Supp. 1989).
20. Id. § 1396b.
21. Id. § 1396a.
22. The reasonableness of the costs claimed by physicians constitutes the primary limitation
on Medicare retrospective reimbursement. Id. § 1395x(v) (defining reasonable cost).
Nationally, Medicare considers 84 percent of a physician's average fee to non-Medicare
patients a reasonable fee for Medicare patients. Therefore, Medicare reimburses physicians 67.2
percent (or 80 percent of 84 percent) of their average fees. On average, state Medicaid programs
reimburse physicians for only 65 percent of physicians' average fees. T. GRANNEMANN & M.
PAULY, CONTROLLING MEDICAID COSTS, FEDERALISM, COMPETITION & CHOICE 69 (1983).
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp. 1989):
(1) [W]hoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind-
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing of any item or service
for which payment may be made ... under [Medicare] ... or a State health care program
-.. shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) [W]hoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to
any person to induce such person-(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing
660
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the statute to deter physicians from advancing their financial interest
over the interests of Medicare and Medicaid patients.2 4 The Anti-
Fraud and Abuse statute imposes criminal sanctions on physicians
who receive remuneration in exchange for referring Medicare or Medi-
caid patients to other health care providers."z In addition, the statute
imposes criminal sanctions on referral facilities that solicit or induce
referrals by remunerating the referring physicians.26
United States v. Greber 7 illustrates the prevailing judicial interpre-
tation of the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute. In Greber, the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals imposed criminal sanctions on a referral facility
that remunerated referring physicians.28 The court emphasized that
criminal liability results with mere proof that the physician's financial
interest may induce the physician to authorize unnecessary referrals.2 9
Whether the physician's financial interest actually induced the referral
is immaterial.3"
The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute employs the term remuneration
to encompass a broad range of activities.31 Even indirect payments
between physicians and referral facilities, such as investment divi-
dends, constitute remuneration.3 2 As a result, physicians who invest
in and refer patients to the same referral facility risk prosecution under
the criminal Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute.
... of any item or service for which payment may be made... under [Medicare] ... or a
State health care program... shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
24. H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3047.
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1). The Civil Monetary Penalties Laws of 1981 and 1987 also
deter physicians from profiting from referrals by providing the government with a civil remedy.
The laws permit courts to impose fines up to $2,000 for each violation on physicians who file false
or fraudulent Medicare or Medicaid claims. Id § 1320a-7a(a).
The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 (MMPPPA) added
another weapon to the federal anti-fraud and abuse arsenal. Upon conviction of fraudulent
behavior by a state or federal authority, the MMPPPA provides for the exclusion or suspension
of convicted physicians from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Medicare and Medicaid
Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 2, 101 Stat. 680 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7 (West Supp. 1989)).
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
27. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985) (payment of "interpretation fees"
by a referral facility to referring physicians violates the criminal Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute).
28. Id. at 70-72.
29. Id. at 72.
30. Id. at 71.
31. 42 U.S.C.A § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
32. The HHS has commented that "[a]s written, the [statute] . .. is so broad that it could be
interpreted literally... to prohibit a physician from receiving dividend payments.." 54 Fed. Reg.
3090 (supplementary information to proposed rule to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001)
(proposed Jan. 23, 1989).
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The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute may permit a physician to invest
in and send Medicare and Medicaid patients to the same referral facil-
ity in two limited circumstances. 33  First, a physician may send
patients to a referral facility that has a bona fide employment relation-
ship with the referring physician.34 Physicians who invest in referral
facilities may argue that their investment interest conveys employer
status to the investing physicians, thus triggering the exception. The
exception, however, has not been applied to permit physicians to
invest in and refer patients to the same health care provider.35
Second, the HHS proposes that physicians may avoid the reach of
the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute by limiting their investments to
referral facilities with over $5,000,000 in assets and over 500 share-
holders. 36 This proposed exception, however, excludes only a limited
number of investments from criminal punishment because not all
referral facilities satisfy the minimum asset and shareholder conditions
of the exception.
33. The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute contains four exceptions. The second and fourth
exceptions address investment agreements between physicians and referral facilities. 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B), (D). The first and third exceptions address compensation agreements
between physicians and referral facilities that do not involve physician investment in referral
facilities, such as volume discount arrangements. Id. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A), (C). Compensation
agreements not involving physician investment are beyond the scope of this Comment.
34. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B). The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute does not define bona fide
employment relationship. HHS recommends that the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute incorporate
the common law definition of employee codified in the tax code at 26 U.S.C.A. § 3121(d)(2)
(West 1989). 54 Fed. Reg. 3095 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001.952(i)) (proposed Jan. 23,
1989).
35. If courts permit physicians to use the employer exception to circumvent the investment
prohibitions of the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute, greater consolidation among health care
providers may result, thus decreasing competition in health care delivery. Economist Mark V.
Pauly warns of the anti-competitive implications of such conduct in The Ethics and Economics of
Kickbacks and Fee Splitting, 10 THE BELL J. ECON. 349 (1979).
36. Investment in most publicly traded drug companies, for example, would fall under this
proposed exception. Thus, a physician can prescribe a drug manufactured by a publicly traded
company in which the physician owns stock without risking criminal sanction. 54 Fed. Reg.
3094 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001.952(a)) (proposed Jan. 23, 1989). HHS proposed this
rule in 1989, pursuant to the authority delegated by Congress to promulgate additional
exceptions to the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(D). This
Comment assumes the final rule will mirror the language in the proposed rule.
Interestingly, HHS originally proposed a broad category of permissible physician investments
on December 23, 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,856. Five days later, however, the HHS withdrew this
proposal. 53 Fed. Reg. 52,448 (1988).
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3. The Prospective Payment System
In the 1980s, Congress recognized that the retrospective payment
system37 does not encourage cost-effective patient care.38 Retrospec-
tive payment discourages physicians from considering the cost-effec-
tiveness of alternative treatments because actual treatment costs
determine the physician's reimbursement. Thus, Congress imple-
mented the prospective payment system (PPS)39 as a financial incen-
tive for health care providers to reduce Medicare and Medicaid costs
by delivering cost-effective treatment.' Prospective payment moti-
vates physicians to deliver cost-effective care by setting a predeter-
mined ceiling for reimbursement.
Congress first enacted PPS in 1982 to reduce Medicare and Medi-
caid payments to hospitals.41 The success of the hospital program
encouraged Congress to expand PPS to physicians.42 Beginning in
1992, physicians treating Medicare or Medicaid eligible patients will
receive prospective reimbursement.4 3 Physicians will know their reim-
bursement allowances prior to treating Medicare-Medicaid patients,
because a predetermined schedule of uniform physician fees will pre-
dict the amount of reimbursement. 4
37. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the retrospective payment system).
38. Introduction, 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 4203 (Sept. 1986).
39. Congress authorized the creation of a prospective payment system for hospital services
covered by Medicare in 1982. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, § 101, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww (West Supp. 1989)).
Congress extended the prospective payment system to physician services covered by Medicare in
1989. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103 Stat. 2169
(1989) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395w-4).
40. Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) Classifications, 1 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
4203 (Sept 1986).
41. Hospitals received PPS reimbursement beginning in 1983, with the establishment of
diagnosis-related groups (DRG). Under the DRG system, the patient's diagnosis-not the
hospital bill-determines the amount of Medicare-Medicaid reimbursement. As of March 1990,
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has categorized 477 DRGs through which
hospitals receive essentially the same fee for treating patients with similar diagnosis. Changes to
the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 1990 Rates, 54 Fed. Reg.
36,452, 36,454 (1989) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412).
42. 135 CONG. REc. S14,423 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989).
43. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103 Stat. 2169
(1989) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395w4). Congress based the new physician payment plan on
the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale developed by W.C. Hsiao. See generally Hsiao, Braun,
Dunn, Becker, Resource-Based Relative Values: An Overview, 260 J.A.M.A. 2347 (1988).
44. Physician fees will not be entirely uniform. Congress permits the HCFA to make
adjustments for geographic discrepancies in practice costs. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §§ 6102(a), 1848(c), 103 Stat. 2171 (1989) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-4).
Beginning January 1, 1992, the transition from the retrospective to prospective payment will
occur in five annual phases implemented by the HCFA. Id §§ 6102(a), 1848(a)(2), 103 Stat. at
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C. The States' Interest in Regulating Physician Investment and
Referral Behavior
Many states have formed agencies to enforce the Anti-Fraud and
Abuse statutory restrictions on physician investment behavior. In
addition, many states have enacted their own restrictions on physician
investment and referral practices. The state regulatory schemes, how-
ever, differ from one another because investment needs differ among
the states.
1. State Enforcement of Federal Regulations
States receiving federal Medicaid grants must investigate fraud and
report their findings to the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA).45 States failing to meet the inspection and reporting require-
ments risk a reduction or loss of federal Medicaid grants.46 In thirty-
nine states, federally-subsidized Medicaid Fraud Control Units
(MFCUs) satisfy the inspection and reporting requirements.47 Con-
gress established a framework for the states to form MFCUs and to
delegate broad investigative and prosecutorial authority to MFCUs.4"
In states still lacking MFCUs, the Office of the State Attorney General
typically assumes the responsibility for investigating and prosecuting
Medicare and Medicaid fraud.4 9
2. State Regulation of Physician Investment and Referral Behavior
State statutes also restrict the investment and referral behavior of
physicians. The states have traditionally controlled the investment
behavior of their citizens.5" Through their laws governing investment
2169. Congress "hoped that this transition would reduce incentives for behavioral responses to
price changes by physicians." 135 CONG. REC. S13,218 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989).
45. 42 C.F.R. pt. 455.15 (1988) (investigation requirements). Id. pt. 455.17 (reporting
requirements). The HCFA, a division of HHS, administers the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(p) (West. Supp. 1989).
47. Thirty-eight states managed MFCUs in 1989. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SEMIANNUAL REPORT 22 (Oct. 1, 1988-Mar. 31, 1989)
(hereinafter SEMIANNUAL REPORT). Alaska will add the thirty-ninth MFCU in 1990.
Telephone interview with Richard Stern, Attorney, Inspector Gen. Div., Office of Gen. Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 28, 1990).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396b(a), (q) (West Supp. 1989). See also 42 C.F.R. pt. 455.21 (1988)
(HCFA minimum guidelines for state MFCUs).
49. Telephone interview with Richard Stern, Attorney, Inspector Gen. Div., Office of Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 28, 1990).
50. "Given the long history of state common-law and statutory remedies against ... unfair
business practices, it is plain that this is an area traditionally regulated by the States." California
v. ARC America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1665 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (federal law does not preempt
state indirect purchaser laws).
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in corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships, and their many
variations, the states control physician investment in these enter-
prises. 1 Moreover, the states govern the referral behavior of physi-
cians through statutory prohibitions on unprofessional physician
conduct. Such statutes, enforced by disciplinary proceedings, punish
improper or fraudulent referral practices. 2
States also regulate and punish physicians' fraudulent investment
and referral behavior through their own anti-fraud and abuse stat-
utes.5 3 These state statutes may further restrict fraudulent investment
and referral practices of physicians who participate in Medicaid or
other state health programs.54
3. Varying Health Care Delivery Among the States
Health care needs vary among the states. For instance, Wash-
ingtonians rarely confront the need Alaskans face for additional kid-
ney dialysis centers.5 Demographic variations, income disparity,
cultural differences, and other factors contribute to the inability of
sparsely populated states, such as Alaska, to attract a sufficient
number of dialysis centers. 6
The states of Utah and Nevada provide another example of varying
state health care needs. The different alcohol consumption rates of the
citizens of Utah and Nevada contribute to their dramatically different
rates of liver cirrhosis.5 7 Many Utah residents are Mormons, and
therefore abstain from consuming alcohol.5 By contrast, many
Nevada residents consume alcohol.59 Because alcohol consumption
51. See, eag., WASH. REV. CODE titles 23-25 (1989).
52. For example, the State of Washington considers the promotion for personal gain of any
unnecessary or inefficacious drug, device, treatment, procedure, or service as unprofessional
conduct. WASH. REv. CODE § 18.130.180(16) (1989). For a comprehensive list of state statutes
regulating physician conduct, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, STATE
REGULATION OF HEALTH MANPOWER app. A (1977) (DHEW Pub. No. (HRA) 77-49).
53. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.68.010, 51.48.280 (1989).
54. For a compilation of 37 state statutes that address fraudulent physician conduct, see
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW, supra note 5, at 36-39. For a discussion of the countless state and
federal regulatory burdens imposed on physicians, see Ellman, Monitor Mania: Physician
Regulation Runs Amok, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 721 (1989).
55. For a statistical comparison of state dialysis rates, see Relman & Rennie, Treatment of
End-Stage Renal Disease: Free but Not Equal, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 996 (1980).
56. Id. at 998.
57. V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 53-54
(1974).
58. Id at 53. Utah's per capita beer consumption, for example, ranks lowest in the nation.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 107 (107th ed. 1986).
59. Nevada's per capita beer consumption ranks second highest in the nation. Id.
665
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contributes to liver disease, Nevada residents require the services of
liver specialists more frequently than their Utah counterparts. 60
As a result of each state's distinct health care needs, a variety of
health care delivery systems emerge. Depending on the needs and
resources of the community, physicians practicing alone, in a partner-
ship, or in a corporate setting may deliver health care. The growth of
health care corporations signifies an important transformation in the
delivery of and payment for health care. From 1980 to 1987, the
number of health maintenance organizations (HMOs)6" jumped from
235 to 647.62 Another type of physician corporation, the preferred
provider organization (PPO),6 3 also grew in the last decade. PPO
enrollment increased from 1.3 million Americans in December 1984 to
16.5 million in July 1986.' 4 Commentators predict that most patients
in the 1990s will be treated by physician-members of health care cor-
porations.65 Physicians who practice in HMOs, PPOs, and other cor-
porate providerships will attract an increasing number of patients
away from sole or group practitioners because of their reduced treat-
ment costs, 66 convenient on-site ancillary services,6 7 and effective mar-
keting techniques.68
Yet health care corporations have not uniformly developed among
the states. 69 The number of HMOs in rural and urban areas, for
60. In Nevada, 18.1 per 100,000 residents died of chronic liver disease in 1986. In Utah, the
rate was dramatically lower, only 7.3 deaths per 100,000 in 1986. CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, Chronic Disease Reports: Deaths from Chronic Liver Disease-United States, 1986. 38
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 798 (1989).
61. Physicians practicing in an HMO deliver health care to members of an enrolled group in
exchange for a fixed periodic payment. R. SHOULDICE & K. SHOULDICE, MEDICAL GROUP
PRACTICE AND HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS 10 (1978). Individual Practice
Associations (IPAs) represent a contractual variation of HMOs. While HMO physicians usually
deliver health care only to HMO-enrolled patients, IPA physicians typically maintain their
individual practices as well as treat IPA-enrolled patients. Id. at 105.
62. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1988 173 (Mar.
1989) (DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 89-1232).
63. Preferred provider organizations are contractual arrangements between health care
consumers and health care providers, typically hospitals and physicians, in which the providers
agree to supply health care at a discounted rate. Koch, Financing Health Services, in
INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES 335, 365 (S. Williams & P. Torrens eds. 1988).
64. Gabel, Jajich-Toth, Williams, Loughran, & Haugh, The Commercial Health Insurance
Industry in Transition, 6 HEALTH AFFAIRS 46, 52 (1987).
65. P. STARR, supra note 1, at 440.
66. Williams, Ambulatory Health Care Services, in INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES
124, 144 (S. Williams & P. Torrens eds. 1988).
67. On-site ancillary services refer to health care services performed by non-physicians, such
as performing x-rays, analyzing laboratory tests, and dispensing prescription medication.
68. R. SHOULDICE & K. SHOULDICE, supra note 61, at 199-242.
69. Emmons, Changing Dimensions of Medical Practice Arrangements, 45 MED. CARE REV.
101, 115 (1988).
666
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example, differ significantly. In 1986, only 22 percent of rural physi-
cians participated in IMOs, while 47 percent of urban physicians par-
ticipated in HMOs.7" In rural and small town settings, physicians
practicing alone or in small groups continue to meet the health care
needs of their communities.71
II. A CALL FOR DECENTRALIZATION
Competition among health care providers has intensified in recent
years, encouraged in part by the federal government. When physi-
cians attempt to respond to competitive pressures by forming cost-
effective practices, however, the investment restrictions of the federal
Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute present a significant impediment.
Increased competition calls for a new approach to regulating physician
investment and referral behavior-decentralization. Congress should
decentralize the regulation of physician investment practices by
allowing the states to regulate potentially fraudulent physician invest-
ment and referral practices.
A. The Conflict Between Competition and the Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Statute
Two forces have played an important role in activating competition
among health care providers-the rise of physician corporations and
the advent of the prospective payment system. First, individual practi-
tioners face greater competition from new corporate forms of health
care providers, whose structure enables them to better respond to mar-
ket and regulatory changes.72 Increasingly, physicians may consider
grouping their talents in some type of corporate arrangement. The
Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute, however, limits the extent that physi-
cians in such an arrangement can participate in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.
The federal Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute prohibits physician cor-
porations from using certain monetary incentives to encourage mem-
ber physicians to deliver cost-effective medical care.73 For instance,
70. IM, at 115.
71. See, eg., PHYSICIAN MARKETPLACE STATISTICS 1989 85, table 52 (M. Gonzalez ed.
1989) (statistics showing geographical distribution of self-employed physicians by size of
practice).
72. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the growth of corporate health
care providers).
73. Although corporate providers, such as HMOs, existed when Congress enacted the Anti-
Fraud and Abuse statute, neither the statute nor its legislative history mentions the investment
and referral behavior of physicians who practice in a corporate setting. H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3039.
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many HMOs award monetary bonuses to physicians who provide cost-
effective medical care, such as admitting fewer patients to hospitals.74
A literal reading of the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute suggests that
the statute prohibits bonus payments if the HMO seeks to treat Medi-
care or Medicaid patients. 75  But HMO bonus payments do not
encourage or result in actual fraud or abuse of Medicare-Medicaid
funds. Rather, the bonus payment rewards the HMO physician for
conserving federal funds. By broadly defining the term remuneration
to include cost-effective remunerations, such as HMO bonus pay-
ments, the federal Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute penalizes the
attempts of corporate health care providers to reduce health care
costs.
Prospective payment is the second competitive force in health care.
The federal government amplified the competitive pressures affecting
physicians by extending the prospective payment system to physician
Medicare-Medicaid reimbursement. Under the uniform reimburse-
ment system mandated by PPS, the federal government will reimburse
physicians at a uniform rate, regardless of actual treatment costs. 7 6 If
treatment costs consistently exceed reimbursement rates, physicians
may be compelled to either refuse to treat Medicare and Medicaid
patients or develop more cost-effective practices.77 The Anti-Fraud
and Abuse statute, however, erects a formidable barrier to many cost-
effective practices. The statute limits a physician's ability to respond
to competitive pressures by prohibiting a physician from referring
patients to facilities in which the physician has an investment
interest.78
Home dialysis exemplifies the barriers to cost-effective responses to
increased competition. Home-administered kidney dialysis costs less
74. R. SHOULDICE & K. SHOULDICE, supra note 61, at 16.
75. The bonus payment in this illustration may subject the HMO and the physician to
criminal sanctions because the bonus can be interpreted as illegal "remuneration" in exchange
for referring a patient for non-hospital treatment. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West Supp.
1989).
76. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (examining the prospective payment system
as applied to physicians' services).
77. Prospective reimbursement presents special problems for some physicians. The cost of
treating some patients will exceed the predetermined reimbursement rate; for other patients, it
will fall below. This variance will create special problems for physicians whose treatment costs
continually surpass the reimbursement rate. The current retrospective payment system
reimburses physicians on average only 67.7 percent of the full cost of their Medicare services.
GRANNEMANN & PAULY, supra note 22, at 69. Prospective reimbursement is less likely to
approach costs because prospective reimbursement is calculated independently from actual costs.
See supra notes 43-44 (examining the prospective payment system as applied to physicians'
services).
78. See supra note 32.
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than hospital-administered dialysis.79 Home dialysis also provides
other important advantages to some patients, such as convenience and
comfort. The investment restrictions in the Anti-Fraud and Abuse
statute, however, prevent physicians from using their capital resources
to offer the advantages of home dialysis to their patients.80 In small
communities, which provide an insufficient market to attract large cor-
porate investors, local physicians may decide to pool their funds to
provide needed home dialysis services. The statute, however, would
prevent physicians from referring their Medicare or Medicaid patients
to their home dialysis service. Liberated from the Anti-Fraud and
Abuse restrictions, physicians could apply their financial resources to
provide their patients with proper and cost-effective care, such as
home dialysis.81
B. Judicial Interpretations and Federal Statutory Amendments
Provide No Effective Alternatives
Both the federal courts and Congress have failed to interpret or
amend the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute to exclude cost-effective
medical treatment from the reach of the statute's criminal sanctions.
By refusing to consider facts justifying the remuneration, the court in
United States v. Greber82 hindered physicians' efforts to initiate the
delivery of cost-effective medical care. 3 In some cases, a physician
may respond to competitive pressures by investing in and referring
patients to a cost-effective medical provider.84 Greber, however,
directs courts to ignore cost-effectiveness defenses.85 Courts need only
establish that the remuneration may possibly induce unnecessary
referrals.86
79. Recognizing that home kidney dialysis costs less to administer than hospital dialysis, the
HCFA reimburses home dialysis providers at a lower rate than hospital dialysis providers. In
1986, the HCFA set the composite rate of home dialysis reimbursement at $96.18 per treatment.
The hospital composite rate equalled $118.65 per dialysis treatment. Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,411
(Aug. 15, 1986). Considering that most chronic dialysis patients receive dialysis three times per
week, home dialysis saves the Medicare program approximately $3,500 per patient per year.
80. See supra note 32.
81. In large communities, where more than one home dialysis provider may be available, the
Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute may not conserve federal Medicare funds by permitting referring
physicians to establish a home dialysis service. Nevertheless, the statute may undermine the
patient-physician relationship by forcing physicians to refer patients to a provider that the
physician thinks provides substandard medical care.
82. 760 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985).
83. Id. at 71.
84. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing physician investment in a home
dialysis service).
85. Greber, 760 F.2d at 71.
86. Id.
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The federal courts are reluctant to revise the Greber doctrine to
reflect Congressional pressures from PPS for cost-effective health care
delivery. In United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hospital Rental
Services, 87 the First Circuit strictly adhered to the Greber interpreta-
tion of the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute.88 The Bay State opinion did
not address PPS or other recent transformations in the delivery and
payment of medical care. In fact, the Bay State court voiced its reluc-
tance to consult recent congressional action in interpreting an earlier
enactment.89
Congressional efforts to remodel the statute have also fallen short.
In 1987, Congress gave HHS the authority to add competitive invest-
ment and referral arrangements to the list of permissible arrange-
ments.90 Administrative delays resulting from rulemaking procedures,
however, prevent the agency from promptly responding to competitive
developments in the health care industry. When the health care mar-
ket within a state reveals the cost-effectiveness of a given investment
and referral practice, providers first must convince the HHS of its
value. Then the HHS must propose a regulation and meet notice and
comment requirements.9" This may take years to accomplish.92
Meanwhile, new competitive practices may emerge and require repeti-
tion of the approval procedure. HHS responses will constantly lag
behind health care market changes, thus defeating the cost-saving
goals of such programs as PPS.
The HHS recently exercised its authority to add exceptions to the
Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute. The agency proposes to authorize phy-
sician investment in, and referral to, large publicly-traded corpora-
tions with a minimum of both $5,000,000 in assets and 500
shareholders.93 This proposal illustrates that HHS intends to use its
delegated authority to draft very specific, instead of general, excep-
87. 874 F.2d 20 (Ist Cir. 1989) (ambulance company convicted for remunerating a hospital
employee in exchange for referring medical emergencies).
88. Id. at 29-30. The Ninth Circuit also strictly observed the Greber doctrine in United
States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (partial owner of a medical clinic convicted for
collecting a fee in exchange for referring blood and urine samples to a laboratory).
89. "[E]ven assuming that the statutory changes and proposed administrative actions show
that ... Congress never intended to criminalize the kind of payments involved here, courts are
chary of allowing a subsequent Congress' comments on the intent of prior legislation to control."
Bay State, 874 F.2d at 31.
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1989).
91. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 1977) (mandatory rulemaking procedures for administrative
agencies).
92. As of April 1990, HHS still has not fulfilled Congress' 1987 request to promulgate
additional exceptions to the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(D).
93. 54 Fed. Reg. 3094 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001.952(a)) (proposed Jan. 23, 1989).
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tions to the Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute.94 These specific criteria
provide little flexibility and fail to accommodate differences in invest-
ment and health care needs between the states. In some states, for
example, physician investment in referral facilities with fewer than 500
shareholders may prove beneficial. By issuing specific criteria, the
HHS discourages physicians and states from experimenting with cost-
effective investment and referral practices in their communities.
Decentralizing the authority to regulate physician investment in refer-
ral facilities would allow states to restrict the most fraudulent prac-
tices while allowing types of physician investment that will most
benefit a particular state.
C. The Argument for State Regulation
Congress should return the authority to regulate the investment and
referral behavior of physicians to the states. The states can apply their
familiarity with the local health care industry to enact regulations that
limit fraudulent practices and address local health care needs, without
unduly hindering physicians' attempts to provide cost-effective medi-
cal care.
1. State Regulation Responds to Local Health Care Needs
The Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute fails to respond to important
state differences in the delivery of health care. The federal statute
places severe restrictions on the investment practices of physicians,
providing only a few specific exceptions that do not contemplate com-
munity health care needs.95 The statute impairs the efforts of health
care providers to develop cost-effective and innovative responses to
deficiencies in local health care delivery.96
Congress should devolve to the states the ability to regulate the
referral practices of investing physicians.97 State legislatures could
then enact statutes that punish the most fraudulent practices, while
94. The explanatory comments to the proposed regulations confirm this assessment. The
HHS stated that the department is currently considering "crafting an additional exemption to the
.. . statute for certain limited partnerships and managing partnership interests that operate
according to standards that we would prescribe." 54 Fed. Reg. 3090 (Jan. 23. 1989).
95. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (describing two exceptions to the Anti-
Fraud and Abuse statute).
96. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing physician investment in a home
dialysis service).
97. Decentralizing the regulation of physician investment and referral behavior does not
mandate decentralizing the regulation of all potentially fraudulent behavior. Regulating
investment and referral behavior, however, requires a separate state approach because this
behavior has an especially important effect on the local delivery of health care.
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allowing beneficial physician investment practices. Congress could
continue to maintain some control by requiring state statutes to meet
some minimum federal threshold.98
All investment arrangements between physicians and referral facili-
ties have the potential to encourage unnecessary referrals based solely
on the physician's monetary interests. 99 Some investments, however,
present a greater incentive for fraudulent conduct than others. For
example, an investment that ties the rate of return directly to the vol-
ume of referrals provides a strong financial incentive for physicians to
abuse their referral privilege."t° In contrast, an investment offering a
fixed rate of return, regardless of the number of patients referred to the
facility, provides a less direct and less powerful incentive for unneces-
sary referrals.' 1 States may discourage the former type of arrange-
ment without broadly prohibiting physician investment in referral
facilities.
An individual state is best suited to decide whether its particular
health care needs warrant a more flexible approach to physician
investment than the federal Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute currently
provides. For example, in a rural community where important dialy-
sis services are in short supply, 0 2 the state could relax physician
investment rules to encourage local physicians to jointly invest in dial-
ysis equipment.
Individual state regulation of physician investment and referral
behavior will not result in more confusion. '0 3 Most physicians confine
98. Minimum guidelines, for example, might require the states to establish a statutory scheme
and periodically report their progress to a federal regulatory agency, such as HHS. The federal
agency, in turn, might conduct its own periodic review of the effectiveness of state programs.
Aid to Families with Dependant Children typifies a state program in which Congress established
minimum guidelines for the states to supplement. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 602 (West Supp. 1989).
99. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing conflict of interest).
100. When a physician's return on investment is directly correlated with the number of
patients referred by the physician, a seemingly innocuous investment may camouflage an illegal
kickback. Kickbacks merit broad governmental prohibition because they provide strong
financial inducement for referral fraud.
101. A physician who refers patients to a facility in which the physician has invested still
receives a form of remuneration, albeit indirectly. The more referrals the facility receives, the
greater the facility's total profits. Thus, the physician's return on investment increases with
additional referrals. An investing physician's incentive to make unnecessary referrals, however,
is diluted because the volume of referrals represents just one of many factors that contribute to
the amount of return on the physician's investment.
102. A statistical comparison of state dialysis rates indicates "an extraordinary variation" in
the use and availability of dialysis among the states. The statistics demonstrate that states with
predominantly rural communities have fewer citizens receiving dialysis than other states. See
Relman & Rennie, supra note 55, at 997.
103. The AMA supports the establishment of a "bright line" rule governing physician
investment and referral practices to facilitate compliance. AMA Statement, supra note 13, at 7.
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their practice to areas within one state,"° thus discrepancies in state
regulations will not affect most practitioners. Conflicting state regula-
tions may affect corporate health care providers who deliver care in
more than one state. Corporate providers, however, possess the
administrative capabilities to stay abreast of disparate state regulatory
structures.10 5 Moreover, the central benefit of decentralization-the
ability of states to enact regulations responsive to local needs-out-
weighs the complexity created by individual state regulation.
2. States Currently Regulate Similar Physician Conduct
The states are able to regulate physician investment and referral
behavior because state laws currently oversee related conduct. In
addition, decentralization will not require the creation of new enforce-
ment structures. Many states have already established the means to
regulate physician conduct.
a. State Regulations Affecting Physicians
The states can claim special knowledge in the regulation of physi-
cian conduct, 10 6 and their expertise could be used to regulate physi-
cian investments in referral facilities. States already regulate business
investment in general and physician conduct specifically.107 In the
process of enacting and enforcing existing state regulations, the states
have acquired unique and detailed knowledge about the activities of
physicians in their communities. A logical extension of the states' reg-
ulatory power over physicians is to permit the states to establish and
enforce limitations on physician referral practices involving physician
investment.
b. The Precedent for State Regulation When Federal Monies Are
Involved
Devolving responsibility for regulating physician investment to the
states, even where federal money is involved, proves sensible when the
proscribed conduct differs between states. Congress recognized the
advantages of decentralized enforcement when it provided financial
incentives for the states to establish Medicaid Fraud Control Units
104. Interview with Dr. Fred Connell, Associate Professor, Department of Health Services,
University of Washington School of Medicine, in Seattle, Washington (Mar. 2, 1990).
105. See generally R. SHOULDICE & K. SHOULDICE, supra note 61, at 66-100 (outlining the
organizational structure of health maintenance organizations).
106. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (reporting on state regulation of physician
investment and referral behavior).
107. lId
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(MFCUs).t"' Currently, MFCUs investigate and prosecute fraudulent
conduct in thirty-eight states.109
In other federally-funded programs where the distribution needs
vary among the states, Congress has permitted states to assume regu-
latory responsibilities. The education system provides an analogy.
The federal government relies on the states to enact regulations for the
efficient distribution of federal educational grants.1 o The federal gov-
ernment recognized the need to allow states to control the allocation
of federal education grants because educational priorities vary among
the states.1" Demographic variations, cultural and linguistic differ-
ences, and income disparities result in divergent educational needs in
each state. These differences prevent the federal government from
effectively allocating federal educational monies within the state. The
states' unique understanding of the educational needs of their citizens
enables them to distribute federal educational resources more effec-
tively than the federal authorities.
This logic extends to the health care industry. Health care needs,
like educational needs, vary among the states. 1 2 State legislatures can
establish regulations on physician investment and referral practices
that respond to this variance more effectively than Congress. State
legislatures have proven their competence in allocating federal funds
in the educational arena. The states should be afforded the same
opportunity in the health care arena.
Even where Congress does not funnel federal funds through the
states, as with Medicare, the federal government has often relied on
the enforcement powers of the states. For example, Congress relies on
the states to enact regulations enforcing the objectives of the Clean
Water Act.1 13 The Act establishes minimum federal guidelines and
108. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a, 1396b(q) (West Supp. 1989). See also 42 C.F.R. pt. 455.21 (1988)
(minimum procedural reqdirements for the operation of state MFCUs). The federal government
subsidizes the first three years of operation of MFCUs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(q). In Fiscal Year
1988, the State MFCUs collected $4 million in fines through enforcement of the fraud and abuse
statutes. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
SEMIANNUAL REPORT 41 (April-September 1988).
109. See supra note 47.
110. See e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 2711(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1989) ("[T]he State educational
agency may allocate the amount of grants ... in such a manner as it determines will best carry
out the purposes of this division.")
111. "[W]ithin these fiscal and targeting restraints, local and State agencies have full
discretion ...." S. REP. No. 222, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 107.
112. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (examining differences in state health care
needs).
113. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West Supp. 1989).
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permits the states to enact more stringent requirements.1 14 The regu-
lation of physician investment and referral behavior can be similarly
managed. The federal government may establish minimum guidelines
for regulating the investment and referral practices of physicians.
Minimum federal guidelines would free the states to develop regula-
tions reflecting their unique health care industry while assuring Con-
gress that federal Medicare-Medicaid funds are not reimbursing
fraudulent or abusive practices.
III. CONCLUSION
The federal Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute currently regulates the
investment and referral practices of physicians. Two recent develop-
ments in the delivery and payment of medical services, however, man-
date a new approach to regulating fraudulent investment and referral
practices. The increasing popularity of physician corporations and the
federal government's new prospective payment system have placed
new pressures on health care providers to reduce costs. The Anti-
Fraud and Abuse statute unnecessarily limits the physician's ability to
respond to these pressures.
Decentralizing the regulation of physician investment and referral
behavior will provide a means of regulating fraudulent behavior amid
changes in the delivery and payment of health care. If Congress
decides to decentralize the regulation of physician investment and
referral behavior, state legislatures should design regulations to bal-
ance the importance of regulating physician fraud and abuse with the
importance of fostering competition in the health care industry. Bal-
ancing regulation and competition can produce statutes that deter
fraudulent investment and referral practices while encouraging com-
petitive health care practices.
Kimberly A. King
114. Id. § 1342(b).
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